Cost Allocation for Efficient and Effective Implementation of Product Take-Back Legislation

Monday, May 5, 2014, 4:00pm – 6:00pm
Presented by Luyi Gui, Atalay Atasu, Ozlem Ergun, and L. Beril Toktay
Located in TBD
In track CoopMAS2014

Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) is a major product take-back policy tool that holds producers nancially responsible for the post-use treatment of their products. EPR implementations in practice are typically collective – a large collection and recycling network (CRN) handles multiple producers’ products. A major policy challenge is to properly allocate the resulting cost among participating producers. In our study, we address this problem using a cooperative network ow game approach. We identify implementable adjustments to the prevalent proportional methods to ensure core allocations. We also demonstrate the tradeo between coalitional stability and other environmental objectives associated with cost allocation in the EPR context based on a biform game model.